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Summary
The aim of this review paper is to evaluate the putative susceptibilities of different free-ranging 
wild animal species in Belgium to SARS-CoV-2 and provide a risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2 
infection in those animals. Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, natural SARS-CoV-2 
infections have mainly been confirmed in domestic and production animals, and in wild animals 
kept in captivity, although the numbers remain limited when compared to human cases. Recently, 
the first SARS-CoV-2 infections in presumably escaped minks found in the wild have been 
detected, further addressing the much-feared scenario of transmission of the virus to animals 
living in the wild and its consequences. Considering the most likely origin of the virus being a wild 
animal and the putative susceptibilities of free-ranging wild animal species to SARS-CoV-2, the 
risk of infection with possible establishment of the virus in these populations has to be 
investigated closely. The authors conclude that most attention should be given to surveillance 
and awareness raising activities for SARS-CoV-2 infection in wild mustelids, bats, wild canids and 
felids, particularly these collected in wildlife rescue centres. People involved in frequent and close 
contact with wild animals should take all necessary precautionary measures to protect wild 
animals against exposure to the virus. One year after the first detection of SARS-CoV-2 in 
humans, the time has come to increase investments in research and surveillance activities in 
animals, including in free-ranging wild animals, as part of a One Health control of this pandemic. 
This study focusing on Belgium could be helpful for other countries with similar animal densities 
and ecosystems.
Keywords 
free-ranging wild animals – risk evaluation – SARS-CoV-2 –– transmission –– wildlife disease 
management 
Introduction 
Covid-19 is a human disease caused by a betacoronavirus from the Coronaviridae family, genus 
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CoronaVirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). The first human cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection were reported in 
Wuhan City, China, in December 2019 (Wu, Chen, & Chan, 2020). While, so far, the exact origin 
of the virus remains unknown, several hypotheses exist (Andersen, Rambaut, Lipkin, Holmes, & 
Garry, 2020; Latham & Wilson, 2020; Y.-Z. Zhang & Holmes, 2020). The majority considers this 
to be a wild animal source (OIE, 2020 a) whereby the hypothesis of some species of horseshoe 
bats (family Rhinolophidae) being original natural hosts for a precursor of SARS-CoV-2 has been 
put forward (Zhou et al., 2020) with transmission to humans occurring most probably through an 
intermediate host (Zhao et al., 2020). Within a few weeks following the outbreak in China, SARS-
CoV-2 human infections were reported all over the world. In response to the rapid spread of the 
virus and the increasing number of cases and deaths, WHO officially declared Covid-19 
(Coronavirus disease 2019) as a pandemic at the beginning of March 2020 (WHO, 2020). 
Meanwhile, compared to the human cases, a significantly lower number of infections with SARS-
CoV-2 has been diagnosed in pets and production animals, in wild animals kept in captivity and 
more recently in  presumably escaped minks found in the wild (OIE, 2020 b). However, 
anthropozoonotic events (SARS-CoV-2 transmission from humans to animals) raise new 
concerns for animal health risk or for the establishment of a new animal reservoir (Munnink et al., 
2020). Furthermore, considering particularly the first cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection reported in 
presumably escaped minks in Utah (Promed, 2020 a) and the possibility of mustelids as 
intermediate host (Zhao et al., 2020), avoiding the possible establishment of a wild animal 
reservoir is of great importance. In order to safeguard the health and wellbeing of affected animal 
species, and of our own, there is need to get a closer look at the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 
free-ranging wild animal species. 
The aim of this review is thus to evaluate the putative susceptibilities of different free-ranging wild 
animal species in Belgium to SARS-CoV-2 and provide a risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2 
infection in those animals. 
Putative susceptibility of free-ranging wild animal species in Belgium to SARS-CoV-2 
infection 
The susceptibility of different animal species to SARS-CoV-2 infection has been studied by 
means of experimental infections, functional and in silico analysis. Angiotensin Converting 
Enzyme 2 (ACE2) is a functional receptor for SARS-CoV-2 (Wan et al., 2020). Depending on 
sequence similarity of their respective ACE2 orthologues, several animal species should be 
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revealed a relatively broad host species for SARS-CoV-2 in vitro (Tang et al., 2020); but with 
several species experimentally proven to be not susceptible in vivo, indicating that the receptor is 
necessary but not sufficient to mediate infection. Endogenous proteases, such as TMPRSS2, 
with proteolytic activity on S have indeed been shown to participate in membrane fusion activity 
(Hoffmann et al., 2020).
At the day of submission (27 January 2021), a limited number of animal species have been 
shown to be susceptible at variable degree in experimental infection, including non-human 
primate, ferret, cat, dog, deer mice, raccoon dog, rabbit, hamster, bank voles, white-tailed deer 
and Egyptian fruit bat (OIE, 2020 c) (Fagre et al., 2020; Ulrich, Michelitsch, et al., 2020; Palmer et 
al., 2021). Natural infections have been only diagnosed in pet cats and dogs, captive big cats and 
great apes, in several minks kept in holdings for fur production in different countries and recently 
in presumably escaped minks (OIE, 2020 b). 
In order to be able to perform a risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging wild 
animals, we first provide an overview of the several families present in Belgium and their putative 
susceptibility for infection with SARS-CoV-2. Considering the very limited natural and 
experimental cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection in wild animals, this information has been deduced 
from the knowledge from their domestic, production and laboratory counterparts.
a) Mustelids (Mustelidae): 
The wild animal species of the family mustelids (Mustelidae) present in Belgium are the 
European pine marten (Martes martes), the stone marten (Martes foina), the ermine 
(Mustela erminea), the badger (Meles meles), the weasel (Mustela nivalis), the polecat 
(Mustela putorius) and the otter (Lutra lutra) (Libois, 1982; Vercayie et al., 2017; Verkem 
et al., 2003). Among these, the stone marten and the badger are the species which are 
the most brought to rescue centres (source : surveillance network wild fauna University of 
Liège, Agency Nature and Forest Brussels Region and Brussels Environment). 
The susceptibility of the ferret (Mustela putorius furo) to SARS-CoV-2 infection has been 
confirmed by several experimental studies (Kim et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2020). Their results 
showed viral replication at the level of the upper respiratory tract with possibility of 
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lung (without confirmation of infectious virus) and a rise of neutralizing antibodies (titre of 
1/128). Beside the transmission of the virus occurring through direct contact between the 
animals, Kim et al. (2020) suggest the possibility of an airborne transmission.
The susceptibility of the farmed mink (Neovison vison) for the virus was confirmed by the 
first natural infections of minks on a holding in the Netherlands on 23 April 2020 (Promed, 
2020 b). Since, SARS-CoV-2 infections in mink holdings have been reported in Denmark, 
Spain, the United States, Sweden, Italy, Greece, France, Lithuania, Canada and Poland 
(OIE, 2020 b – latest update on 23 February 2021). Independent human-to-mink 
transmission has been identified as the most probable route of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 
mink instead of farm to farm transmission. For the infected minks in the Netherlands, 
besides developing respiratory disease symptoms, a slightly increased mortality was also 
detected on the farms (Oreshkova, Molenaar, Vreman, Harders, Munnink, Hakze-van der 
Honing, et al., 2020). At the onset of the outbreak in mink holdings in the Netherlands, the 
Belgian authorities applied a snapshot serological monitoring and a weekly virological 
monitoring in the 8 remaining mink farms, all tests results being negative. In December 
2020, the mink industry in Belgium decided to stop all its activities (source: Belgian 
Federal Agency for Safety of the Food Chain). 
On 11 December 2020, SARS-CoV-2 infection in presumably escaped minks present in 
the surrounding area of infected mink holdings in Utah was confirmed. Antibodies against 
SARS-CoV-2 were detected by virus neutralisation in 11 mink escapees, of which 3 had a 
high cycle threshold detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid by real time RT-PCR of nasal 
swabs and a lung tissue specimen. These results were obtained in the frame of wildlife 
surveillance conducted as part of One Health investigations by the USDA Animal and 
Health Inspection Services in meso-carnivores and other species around infected minks 
farms in Utah, Michigan, Wisconsin and Oregon. Although, there is no evidence that 
SARS-CoV-2 is circulating or has been established in wild populations surrounding the 
infected mink holdings nor that other wildlife species have been infected, Shriner et al. 
(2021) stress the concerning possible interaction with susceptible free-ranging wild animal 
populations. The sequence of the viral genome was identical as those obtained from the 
infected mink holdings (OIE 2020 b, Promed, 2020 a, and personal communication from 
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service).
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The wild animal species of the felids family (Felidae) present in Belgium are mostly the 
stray and feral cat (Felis Catus) with a few European wild cats (Felis sylvestris), and 
lynxes (Felis lynx) (Libois, 1982; Vercayie et al., 2017; Verkem et al., 2003).
Cats (Felis catus) seem susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 according to studies from Shi et al. 
(2020) and Halfmann et al. (2020). A natural infection of a domestic cat has been 
confirmed in Belgium (Garigliany et al., 2020) and worldwide (OIE, 2020 b). Transmission 
from infected humans to domestic cats and wild big cats kept in captivity is the most 
probable route of SARS-CoV-2 infection.
c) Canids (Canidae): 
The wild animal species of the canids family (Canidae) present in Belgium are mostly the 
red fox (Vulpes Vulpes), but several raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), and a few 
grey wolves (Canis lupus) and stray dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) have also been 
documented (Libois, 1982; Vercayie et al., 2017; Verkem et al., 2003).
Domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) have a very low susceptibility for the virus (Shi et 
al., 2020). In Hong Kong, two dogs (from a cohort of 17) which had been in contact with 
SARS-CoV-2 positive patients, were confirmed positive but didn’t show any signs of the 
disease nor did they transmit the virus (Promed, 2020 c, d). However, detection of SARS-
CoV-2 infection has also been described in dogs showing clinical signs without 
information on other putative co-infections (Promed, 2020 f). On the other hand, 
experimental infection of raccoon dogs with SARS-CoV-2 demonstrated their susceptibility 
to the virus (Freuling et al., 2020). The infected animals showed no clinical signs, a high 
level of shedding, efficient transmission of the virus and seroconversion. 
d) Bats (Chiroptera): 
The wild animal species of the bats family (Chiroptera) present in Belgium are listed in 
Table 1. 
There is currently no evidence of a natural infection with SARS-CoV-2 in bats. An 
experimental study using Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus), belonging to a 
family (Pteropodidae) of chiroptera not present in Europe, showed that the animals 
became infected but did not show any clinical sign of disease. A transient infection of the 
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inoculated bats. Intraspecies transmission of the virus to in-contact animals also occurred. 
The authors therefore stress the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission to some free-living bat 
populations (Schlottau et al., 2020). As the Egyptian fruit bats are not present in Europe, 
indigenous bat species to Europe should first be tested for SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility. 
Furthermore, the Big Brown Bat (Eptesicus fuscus), a North American bat species, was 
experimentally challenged with SARS-CoV-2 but showed no susceptibility for infection 
(Hall et al., 2020). 
Table 1 : bat families and species observed in Belgium (source : Vleermuizenwerkgroep 
Natuurpunt Studie – update 15 January 2021)
Bat family Species Status (r: reproduction, u: present status 
unclear, v: vagrant, m: migratory)
Barbastelle Bat (Barbastella 
barbastellus)
r
Northern bat (Eptesicus 
nilssonii)
u
Big Brown Bat (Eptesicus 
serotinus)
r
Alcathoe's Myotis (Myotis 
alcathoe)
u
Bechstein's Bat (Myotis 
bechsteinii)
r
Brandt's Bat (Myotis brandtii) r
Pond Bat (Myotis dasycneme) r
Daubenton's Bat (Myotis 
daubentonii)
r
Geoffroy's Bat (Myotis 
emarginatus)
r
Greater Mouse-eared Bat 
(Myotis myotis)
r
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Greater Noctule Bat (Nyctalus 
lasiopterus)
v
Leisler's Bat (Nyctalus leisleri) r
Common Noctule (Nyctalus 
noctule)
r
Kuhl's Pipistrelle Bat 
(Pipistrellus kuhlii)
v
 Nathusius' pipistrelle Bat 
(Pipistrellus nathusii)
m
Common pipistrelle Bat 
(Pipistrellus pipistrellus)
r
Soprano pipistrelle Bat 
(Pipistrellus pygmaeus)
u
Brown Long-eared Bat 
(Plecotus auritus)
r
Grey Big-eared Bat (Plecotus 
austriacus)
r
The parti-coloured Bat 
(Vespertilio murinus)
m
Greater Horseshoe Bat 
(Rhinolophus ferrumequinum)
rRhinolophidae
Lesser Horseshoe Bat 
(Rhinolophus hipposideros)
r
e) Lagomorphs (Lagomorpha): 
The wild animal species of the lagomorphs family (Lagomorpha) present in Belgium are 
the Brown Hare (Lepus europaeus) and the Wild Rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) (Libois, 
1982; Vercayie et al., 2017; Verkem et al., 2003). 
The New-Zealand White rabbit has a low susceptibility for infection with SARS-CoV-2 
under experimental conditions (Mykytyn et al., 2020). The rabbits showed limited clinical 
signs and the virus was detected with PCR at the level of the nose, throat and rectum 
while the longest infectious virus shedding was taking place in the nose. Neither virus 
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f) Rodents (Rodentia):
The wild animal species of the rodents family (Rodentia) present in Belgium are listed in 
Table 2. 
Syrian or golden hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus) (Chan et al., 2020; Sia et al., 2020), 
deer mice (Peromyscus maniculatus), a New World species not present in Europe (Fagre 
et al., 2020), and transgenic mice for the receptor ACE2 of human origin (Gu et al., 2020) 
are very susceptible to the virus. The Syrian or golden hamster is, together with the non-
human primates and the ferret, an animal which shows clinical signs very similar to those 
observed in humans. After experimental infection (through the nose with a viral inoculum 
of 105 plaque forming units) shallow breathing and weight loss appear as clinical signs. 
The experiments showed transmission of the virus between hamsters, but this was not 
investigated in mice. Furthermore, experimental infection of the bank vole showed a very 
low susceptibility for SARS-CoV-2 infection and no transmission to contact-animals 
(Ulrich, Michelitsch, et al., 2020). 
Table 2 : rodents families and species present in Belgium (Libois, 1982; Vercayie et al., 
2017; Verkem et al., 2003)
Rodent family Species
Cricetidae field vole (Microtus agrestis)
common vole (Microtus arvalis)
bank vole (Clethrionomys glareolus)
European pine vole (Microtus 
subterraneus)
European water vole (Arvicola terrestris)
muskrat (Ondatra zibethicus)
European hamster (Cricetus cricetus)*
Muridae house mouse (Mus musculus)
wood mouse (Apodemus sylvaticus)
yellow-necked mouse (Apodemus 
flavicollis)









This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
harvest mouse (Micromys minutus)
black rat (Rattus rattus)
Gliridae edible dormouse (Glis glis)
garden dormouse (Eliomys quercinus)
hazel dormouse (Muscardinus 
avellanarius)
Sciuridae red squirrel (Sciurus vulgaris)
Eastern grey squirrel (Sciurus 
carolinensis) fox squirrel (Sciurus niger)
Siberian chipmunk (Tamias sibiricus)
Castoridae European beaver (Castor fiber)
Myocastoridae coypu (Myocastor coypus)
*The European hamster is near extinction in Belgium.
g) Hedgehogs (Erinaceidae): 
The wild animal species of the Erinaceidae family present in Belgium is the hedgehog 
(Erinaceus europaeus) (Libois, 1982; Vercayie et al., 2017; Verkem et al., 2003).
Currently, the susceptibility of hedgehog (Erinaceus europaeus) for SARS-CoV-2 has not 
yet been studied. This would be useful since this species is highly present in the rescue 
centres in Belgium and it is known that they are susceptible to another Betacoronavirus, 
being the Erinaceus coronavirus (EriCov). The latter belongs to the same genus 
Betacoronavirus as SARS-CoV-2 but to a different subgenus, Merbecovirus (Corman et 
al., 2014; Monchatre-Leroy et al., 2017). 
h) Bovids, cervids and suids (Bovinae, Cervidae, Suidae) – Reptiles, amphibians and fish - 
Birds : 
Currently, there is no scientific evidence for susceptibility in both natural or experimental 
infection in these animal families except for bovids and cervids. 
A very low susceptibility for cattle for SARS-CoV-2 infection was confirmed based on the 
information from the experimental study done by Ulrich, Wernike, Hoffmann, Mettenleiter, 
and Beer (2020). Also, a recent preprint publication has shown that the white-tailed deer 
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efficiently transmit the virus to other white-tailed deer through indirect contact. However, 
infected animals do not present clinical disease signs. The deer species most related to 
white-tailed deer in Belgium is roe deer (Capreolus capreolus). Their potential status as a 
reservoir species is unknown and should therefore be investigated (Palmer et al., 2021). 
Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 release, exposure and consequence of the occurrence in free-
ranging wild animals
Risk assessments for animal health usually consider three main steps (Dufour et al., 2011), 
namely assessment of the release of the hazard from its source, of exposure to the hazard (while 
release assessment and exposure assessment are further combined to provide with occurrence 
probability) and the consequence of the occurrence of the hazard. Considering SARS-CoV-2 as 
the hazard, occurrence of the hazard should be considered as SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-
ranging wild animals. As such, the risk is mainly based on literature survey and experts advice 
and can be scaled in a qualitative way from ‘very low’ to ‘high’, based on a combination of a 
‘likelihood assessment scale’ and a ‘consequence assessment scale’.
Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 release
The infectious virus is mainly present in respiratory secretions of SARS-CoV-2 infected humans, 
but also from some pets and some production animal species (minks). Isolation of the virus has 
also been achieved from urine and stool samples from SARS-CoV-2 infected humans (Cuicchi, 
Lazzarotto, & Poggioli, 2020; Jeong et al., 2020) and from stool from experimentally infected 
ferrets (Kim et al., 2020). Therefore, the possibility of presence of SARS-CoV-2 in the natural 
aquatic environment through waste water treatment plants has also been considered (Franklin & 
Bevins, 2020). So far, in general, the presence of infectious virus in the natural aquatic 
environment has not been demonstrated (Patel, Chaubey, Pittman Jr, Mlsna, & Mohan, 2020). 
There is a lack of scientific information about the quantification, the persistence and the infectivity 
of the virus in impurified waste water, sewage sludge, surface and sea waters (ANSES advice nr. 
2020-SA-0059). Studies performed on the survival of surrogate coronaviruses in surface water, 
wastewater, sludge and bio-solid waste suggest a very short time of survival of SARS-CoV-2 at 
temperatures higher than 20°C (Carraturo et al., 2020). 
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Free-ranging wild animal species are likely to be most exposed to SARS-CoV-2 when in direct or 
indirect contact with infected humans. Transmission of this respiratory virus mainly occurs 
through respiratory droplets or airborne aerosols (R. Zhang, Li, Zhang, Wang, & Molina, 2020). 
In comparison with pet and production animals, direct contact between humans (including those 
infected with SARS-CoV-2) and free-ranging wild animals is very limited. The most important risk 
activities imply catching, keeping, handling, caring and releasing free-ranging wild animals. In this 
respect, co-operators of wildlife rescue centres (including volunteers), citizens submitting injured 
animals, and persons involved in activities of research, surveillance and management in wildlife 
seem to have the highest risk. Besides those, other groups such as nature professionals 
(foresters, academic researchers, nature guides etc.) and the broad public involved in nature 
activities have limited contact with free-ranging animals, and thus represent a lower risk, if 
infected with SARS-CoV-2, of transmitting the virus to free-ranging wild animals. However, it 
should be noted that certain species such as bats, stone martens and hedgehogs have been 
observed to make their nesting or resting sites in buildings relatively close to humans. 
Uncertainties exist for the frequency and closeness of contact moments between free-ranging 
wild animals and pets and production animals. Particular attention should be given to 
transmission that could occur through predator-prey interactions and when using ferrets at 
hunting activities for rabbits for example. Uncertainties remain for other indirect transmission 
routes such as the orofecal route or fomites (through inanimate surfaces). Conflicting results on 
the efficiency of the oral route for SARS-CoV-2 infection have been obtained so far. Rhesus 
macaques were not infected when inoculated via the transgastric route (Deng et al., 2020) while 
Syrian hamsters got subclinically infected via the oral route (Lee et al., 2020). Exposure to waste 
water or material (such as waste) contaminated by humans infected with SARS-CoV-2 should 
also be considered. For instance, the study of Franklin and Bevins (2020) suggests a hypothetic 
model for the infection of wild free-ranging animals with SARS-CoV-2 in North America where the 
virus in the faeces of infected humans would reach the natural aquatic environment through 
waste water treatment plants. The presence of viral RNA in faeces was also discussed (Bivins et 
al., 2020). 
Consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection
The occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging wild animals may have an impact on the 
health of both animals and humans.
First, the risk of introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into endangered and susceptible wild animal 
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outbreaks in Dutch minks farms, the infection is very contagious as the virus spreads rapidly 
throughout the farm and infected minks even if housed separately. The infected minks showed 
respiratory disease signs, and increased mortality was present in some farms. Also, 90 % of the 
infected minks developed antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 (Enserink, 2020). Taken into account 
the high transmissibility within a dense animal population and the high susceptibilities of certain 
animal species, the epidemic situation in minks farms reflects what could happen in case of 
infection with SARS-CoV-2 in free-ranging wild animal populations, especially in case of 
gregarious species.
Then, if a reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 would persistently establish in free-ranging wild animal 
populations, recurring epidemics in the human population could be even more challenging to 
control. In the context of the outbreaks in mink farms in the Netherlands, a Dutch research team 
considered it likely that minks and other mustelids could be a true reservoir of SARS-CoV-2, 
although further research is needed (Munnink et al., 2020). Given the high susceptibility of the 
raccoon dog, this animal species could also become a reservoir. 
Risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging wild animals species
The risk of a SARS-Cov-2 infection is the combined result of the assessment of the likelihood that 
an infection would occur (4 levels : very low, low, high, very high) and the consequence. Two 
different consequences were considered, either the severity of clinical consequences for 
individual human or animal health (4 levels : marginal, minor, medium and major), or the potential 
that the infection would lead to the installation of a reservoir. The combination of likelihood and 
consequence led to a final appreciation of the risk for infection going from very low, low, moderate 
to high (see table 3 below).
Consequence assessment
Marginal Minor Medium Major
Very High Low Moderate High High
High Low Low Moderate High
Likelihood 
assessment
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Tab
le 3 
: Risk matrix used to classify the level of risk: each assessment comes from expert opinion based 
on the results of experimental infection in the species itself or closely related and/or on reports of 
individual infections from the field. These results and data allow the qualitative assessment of the 
‘likelihood of occurrence’ of the SARS-CoV-2 infection (infectivity for the species as well as 
transmission potential to congeners) and the ‘consequences’ of this infection (sensitivity to the 
infection at the clinical level as well as putative reservoir establishment). The method is described 
in the Guidelines for the opinions of the Scientific Committee established by the FASFC 
(http://www.favv-
afsca.fgov.be/scientificcommittee/publications/brochures/guidelinesopinions/_documents/2017-
04-19_GuidelinesfortheopinionsoftheScientificCommittee_en.pdf, adapted) which is based on 
classical Zepeda matrix (Zepeda, 1998 and 2002 ) and OIE’s method for risk at import in animal 
Health (OIE, 2016).
The risk assessment was performed for the following five possible transmission routes : 
a) Risk of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from an infected person to a free-ranging wild 
animal (see figure 1 – transmission route A):
Currently, infection of free-ranging wild animals by humans is the most probable route of 
infection. The wildlife rescue centres form the most probable location where such transmission 
could occur.
The risk for individual animal health due to the infection of free-ranging wild animals by infected 
humans is qualified as “moderate” for wild mustelids (by analogy with the minks and ferrets); “low” 
for wild felids, wild canids and rodents; and “very low” for all other free-ranging wild animal 
species. 
Taken into account the risk infected raccoon dogs represent for a SARS-CoV-2 reservoir, the 
authors are in favour of setting up an appropriate surveillance and risk mitigation measures 
strategies for kept and free-ranging wild raccoon dogs. Also we have to take into account that 
raccoon dogs have been suggested as intermediate hosts for severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (Xu et al., 2009). Attention should also be given to the possible 
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transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from human to foxes as the taxonomic proximity of this species is 
close to raccoon dogs. 
b) Risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from an infected domestic animal (production or 
pet animal) to a free-ranging wild animal (see figure 1 – transmission route B):
Currently, the risk linked to the infection of a free-ranging wild animal through transmission from a 
domestic animal infected with SARS-CoV-2 is qualified as “very low” to “low” (for feral cats and 
wild mustelids through domestic animals other than production minks) and “moderate” (for wild 
mustelids through transmission from escaped production minks). 
Mink industry usually relies on closed buildings. However infected mink escaping from a 
contaminated holding is a continuing risk for susceptible animals in the wild. This risk should be 
taken into account in every country where minks are used for the fur industry.
Attention should also be paid to domestic cats infected with SARS-CoV-2 by their owner as they 
could possibly transmit the virus to stray or feral cats, which in turn could infect surviving prey 
animals like rodents or bats if susceptible for the virus (Ancillotto, Serangeli, & Russo, 2013) (De 
Bruyn et al. 2020), or production animals such as minks (Oreshkova, Molenaar, Vreman, 
Harders, Munnink, Honing, et al., 2020). Anecdotic infection of stray cats have already been 
reported during the outbreaks in the mink farms in the Netherlands even if the infection route for 
these infections have not been clarified (final report Dutch government, 2020). 
c) Risk of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from free-ranging wild animals to humans (see 
figure 1 – transmission route C): 
In the context of the current human pandemic, the risk for humans getting infected with SARS-
CoV-2 via wild animals is qualified as “very low” compared to the risk of infection from person to 
person or to the risk of infection from a contaminated environment. 
For persons working in wildlife rescue centres or in research centres, the risk is qualified as “low 
to moderate”. This risk is “higher” for the more vulnerable groups of the human population ( the 
elderly, people with comorbidities, etc.).
d) Risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between free-ranging wild animals 
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The risk of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between free-ranging wild animals has been qualified as 
“very low” for all susceptible animal species except for mustelids. For mustelids, the risk of 
transmission between individuals and of persistent establishment is qualified as “moderate”. 
Indeed, SARS-CoV-2 infection spread quickly in minks farms in the Netherlands. Besides that, in 
the past, other viruses, such as the canine distemper virus (caused by a paramyxovirus) or the 
Aleutian mink disease (caused by a parvovirus), have been introduced and spread within the 
population of mustelids in the wild indicating effective transmission and dissemination possibilities 
for an emerging virus in the wild if some animals are susceptible (Akdesir et al., 2018; Knuuttila et 
al., 2015). The risk of persistent establishment of SARS-CoV-2 in the wild mustelid population is 
thus qualified as “moderate”.
Attention should also be paid to raccoon dogs as they could represent a similar chain of 
transmission although at very lower level in Europe. Indeed, they represent a massive industry in 
China, where they are bred on farms and caught in the wild for their fur and they were found 
susceptible to SARS-CoV-1 (Cherry & Krogstad, 2004). Such industry does not exist in Western 
Europe and the risk can thus be considered as very low. 
e) Risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from a free-ranging wild animal to a domestic 
animal:
The risk of a domestic animal getting infected with SARS-CoV-2 by a free-ranging infected animal 
has been qualified as “very low” for all domestic species. Many risk factors have an influence on 
the probability of domestic animal exposure to a free-ranging wild animal, such as habitat, 
outdoors access, hunting behaviour of the pet, the level of biosecurity of the farm in case of 
production animals (open or closed type), etc. 
Conclusions and perspectives
Based on the current state of knowledge, most attention should be paid to wild mustelids, bats, 
wild felids and canids. Following the reported risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging wild 
animals, the following recommendations can be made concerning surveillance and awareness 
raising :
- For all activities at risk involving human-to-animal contacts, biosecurity measures 
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transmission of the virus to free-ranging wild animals such as personal protective 
equipment in all circumstances, and, if SARS-CoV-2 positive, staying away from free-
ranging wild animals during a period of at least 15 days since the diagnosis. Guidelines 
have been published about the preventive measures to take while handling free-ranging 
wild animals in times of the Covid-19 pandemic (IUCN SSC WHSG and OIE, 2020); 
- Testing of all bats, wild mustelids, wild felids and canids in rescue centres (regardless of 
the presence of clinical signs) by qPCR before releasing them into the wild. If possible, 
oropharyngeal samples should be taken, or, if not possible, rectal swabs or faeces;
- Awareness raising of the different concerned stakeholders such as the wildlife rescue 
centres;
- Providing guidelines for the broad public on how to handle dead or injured free-ranging 
wild animals, and information about which organizations need to be contacted;
Interplay between humans, animals and environment in the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 
infection cannot be ignored. The proven susceptibilities of certain animal species, the reported 
outbreaks in many minks holdings in the world, the documented reverse zoonotic transmission in 
mink holdings in the Netherlands and Denmark, and the recent detection of  SARS-CoV-2 
infection in presumably escaped minks found nearby infected production animal holdings in the 
United States indicate the urge to invest the necessary means in further research and 
surveillance activities in animals, more specifically in free-ranging wild animals. A multidisciplinary 
One Health approach is needed to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic, and to prevent the next 
recurring epidemics if a reservoir would establish among free-ranging wildlife populations. 
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